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Timing or Targeting: The Asymmetric Motives of Capital Structure Decisions | 456.91 KB |
This study investigates how the timing behavior and the adjustment towards the target of capital structure interact in the capital structure decisions. Past literature finds that both timing and targeting are significant in determining the leverage ratio which is inconsistent with any standalone framework. This study argues that the coexistence of both timing and targeting is possible. The preference of the firm for timing behavior or targeting behavior depends on the cost of deviation from the target. Since the cost of deviation from the target is likely to be asymmetric between overleveraged and underleveraged firms, the direction of the deviation from the target leverage is expected to alter the preference toward timing or targeting in the capital structure decision. Using GMM-system estimators with the Malaysian data for the period of 1992-2009, this study finds that Malaysian firms, on average, adjust their leverage at a slow speed of 12.7% annually increased to 14.2% when the timing variable is accounted for. Moreover, the speed of adjustment is found to be significantly higher and the timing role is lower for overleveraged firms compared with underleveraged firms. Overleveraged firms seem to find less flexibility to time the market as more pressure is exerted on them to return to the target regardless the timing opportunities because of the higher costs of deviation from the target leverage. Underleveraged firms place lower priority to rebalance toward the target compared with overleveraged firms as the costs of being underleveraged is lower and hence, they have more flexibility to time the market. The findings of this study support that tradeoff theory and timing theory are not mutually exclusive. Firms consider both targeting and timing in their financing decisions but the preference of one motive over the other is conditional on the cost of the deviation from the target.